Retro on the war in Ukraine: historical lessons, escalation folly, assessments, costs, and countering Putin's theory of victory
Patrick Wintour, UK Guardian: ‘We’re in 1938 now’: Putin’s war in Ukraine and lessons from history
One of the contemporary politicians most influenced by the past is the Estonian prime minister, Kaja Kallas, and not just because of her country’s occupation by Russia or her personal family history of exile.
She said the same mistake was made in 1938 when tensions in Abyssinia, Japan and Germany were treated as isolated events. The proximate causes of the current conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, the South China Sea and even Armenia might be different, but the bigger picture showed an interconnected battlefield in which post-cold war certainties had given way to “great-power competition” in which authoritarian leaders were testing the boundaries of their empires. The lesson – and necessity – was to resist and rearm. “The lesson from 1938 and 1939 is that if aggression pays off somewhere, it serves as an invitation to use it elsewhere,” Kallas said.
Her favourite historian, Prof Tim Snyder, adds a twist by reimagining 1938 as a year in which Czechoslovakia, like Ukraine in 2022, had chosen to fight: “So you had in Czechoslovakia, like Ukraine, an imperfect democracy. It’s the farthest democracy in eastern Europe. It has various problems, but when threatened by a larger neighbour, it chooses to resist. In that world, where Czechoslovakia resists, there’s no second world war.”
Snyder said such an outcome had been possible. “They could have held the Germans back. It was largely a bluff on the German side. If the Czechs resisted, and the French and the British and maybe the Americans eventually started to help, there would have been a conflict, but there wouldn’t have been a second world war.
“Instead, when Germany invaded Poland in 1939, it was invading Poland with the Czech armaments industry, which was the best in the world. It was invading with Slovak soldiers. It was invading from a geographical position that it only gained because it had destroyed Czechoslovakia.”
Snyder drove home his lesson from history: “If Ukrainians give up, or if we give up on Ukraine, then it’s different. It’s Russia making war in the future. It’s Russia making war with Ukrainian technology, Ukrainian soldiers from a different geographical position. At that point, we’re in 1939. We’re in 1938 now. In effect, what Ukrainians are letting us do is extend 1938.”
William Alberque, Stimson Center: On the folly of fearing Russian escalation and the necessity of the standing up to what Putin is: a bully
Professor Phillips O’Brien, University of St. Andrews: The main lesson of the war so far is that Ukraine can win if armed properly
The first six months of 2024 have reinforced the primary lesson of the war so far. Ukraine can win if armed properly. If not, it can still make Russia suffer grievously, but will struggle. If you want the war over sooner, arm Ukraine to win it.
Professor Paul Poast, University of Chicago: Are the "opportunity costs" of arming Ukraine too high?
Short answer: no
Long answer: compared to what?
It's not clear that Ukraine actually is a "hard case" for the opportunity cost argument.
First, while the sums spent on Ukraine are large, they are not that big compared to defense budgets. Indeed, if anything, one could say that support to Ukraine is countering Russia "on the cheap".
Second, even with that relatively low level of spending, its been clear that the US hasn't refrained from diverting the resources to other causes (see how some munitions for Ukraine were diverted to Israel).
For more on the opportunity costs of aiding Ukraine, see: Peter Dickinson, Atlantic Council: Arming Ukraine is cheap compared to the far higher price of Russian victory
Opponents of continued military aid to Ukraine often say it is too expensive. In reality, it is infinitely cheaper than the alternative. They also claim supporting Ukraine risks provoking World War III, but in truth, nothing is more likely to provoke Putin than Western weakness.
Institute for the Study of War: Ukrainian victory possible with Western comittment
Putin's theory of victory hinges on a critical assumption that the West will abandon Ukraine to Russian victory, either on its own accord or in response to Russian efforts to persuade the West to do so, and it is far from clear that the West will do so.
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The West must not surrender to Russia's strategic effort to destroy Western commitment to Ukrainian survival and must remember that Ukrainian victory has always been possible as long as the West remains committed to that goal.